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THE FORUM SELECTION DEFENSE 
STEPHEN E. SACHS* 
INTRODUCTION 
What does it mean to select a forum? Lawyers have written forum 
selection clauses for decades without settling on an answer. Parties of-
ten agree that they can or have to sue each other in particular courts. 
But what is that agreement, legally speaking? Is it just an ordinary 
contract, to be enforced by damages for breach,1 or by specific per-
formance in equity?2 Is it an invocation of forum non conveniens,3 or 
a “private expression” of “venue preferences,”4 or—as the Supreme 
Court recently suggested in Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. U.S. 
District Court—a permanent “waive[r] [of] the right to challenge the 
preselected forum as inconvenient”?5 Is it a matter of substance or 
procedure, of state law or federal? Or is it something else entirely? 
Whatever forum selection might be, lawyers also disagree about 
how to invoke it. Atlantic Marine closed off one method of enforce-
ment in federal court, namely a motion to dismiss on venue grounds—
whether under 28 U.S.C. § 1406 or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
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 1.  See Scott Dodson, Atlantic Marine and the Future of Party Preference, 66 HASTINGS 
L.J. 675, 677, 687 (2015) [hereinafter Dodson, Atlantic Marine]; Scott Dodson, Party Subordi-
nance in Federal Litigation, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (2015) [hereinafter Dodson, Party 
Subordinance]. 
 2.  Graydon S. Staring, Forgotten Equity: The Enforcement of Forum Clauses, 30 J. MAR. 
L. & COM. 405 (1999). 
 3.  See David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Se-
lection Clauses in the Federal Courts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 973, 1014–15 (2008). 
 4.  Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 30 (1988). 
 5.  134 S. Ct. at 582. 
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12(b)(3).6 Instead, the Court suggested, defendants can try to move 
the case through a § 1404(a) venue transfer or a dismissal for forum 
non conveniens.7 But are these the only means available? Can a plain-
tiff’s violation of the agreement simply bar recovery? Would it justify 
summary judgment under Rule 56, judgment on the pleadings under 
12(c), or dismissal for failure to state a claim under 12(b)(6)?8 Or can 
defendants simply move “to dismiss,” without citing any Rule at all?9 
This Article seeks to resolve both disagreements—what forum se-
lection is, and how it can be enforced. To start with, forum selection is 
best understood as a form of waiver. When parties agree to permit suit 
in a given court, they’re attempting to waive any defenses they might 
have had to being sued in that court in particular. When they go fur-
ther and make the agreement mandatory, requiring suit in a particular 
court, they’re also attempting to waive any rights they might have had 
to seek relief somewhere else. Whether these agreements are valid—
that is, whether they succeed in waiving the rights they purport to 
waive—is a question of procedure, not just of contract law. And as a 
procedural question, it depends on the law of the forum: state proce-
dure in state court and federal procedure in federal court, no matter 
what law gives rise to the claim. 
Often a forum selection problem arises the way it did in Atlantic 
Marine, with the plaintiff defying the agreement by suing in some 
other (and otherwise-appropriate) federal court. If the account above 
is right, and forum selection is really a matter of waiver, then the 
agreement provides a reason not to let the suit proceed—at least not 
in that forum. In fact, if the account above is wrong, and forum selec-
tion really is just a matter of contract, then the agreement still pro-
vides a reason not to let the suit proceed in that forum. Either way, fo-
rum selection acts as a defense, “a reason why the plaintiff should not 
recover or establish that which he seeks by his complaint or peti-
tion.”10 More specifically, it’s an affirmative defense, one that “will de-
 
 6.  Id. at 577. Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent references in the text to U.S. Code 
sections are to Title 28, and subsequent references to “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
 7.  Id. at 579–80. 
 8.  On Rule 12(b)(6), see Rivera v. Centro Médico de Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 15 (1st 
Cir. 2009). 
 9.  See Bradley Scott Shannon, Enforcing Forum-Selection Clauses, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 777 
(2015). 
 10.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 509 (10th ed. 2014) (quoting EDWIN E. BRYANT, THE 
LAW OF PLEADING UNDER THE CODES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 240 (Boston, Little, Brown & 
Co. 2d ed. 1899)). 
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feat the plaintiff’s . . . claim, even if all the allegations in the complaint 
are true.”11 
The Federal Rules clearly explain how the defendant should raise 
this defense: by “affirmatively stat[ing]” it in the answer, as Rule 8 re-
quires of “any avoidance or affirmative defense.”12 Often the forum 
selection issue will be open-and-shut. When there’s “no genuine dis-
pute as to any material fact,” the defendant can move immediately for 
summary judgment under Rule 56, even before filing an answer.13 
When the agreement is incorporated in the complaint (as is typical in 
contract cases), the defendant doesn’t need to file an answer and can 
simply move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). And when the facts real-
ly are contested, the dispute should be resolved through our regular 
means of finding facts—including, in a jury case, a trial by jury. 
Treating forum selection as a defense might seem strange, but 
there’s nothing theoretically unusual about it. The Federal Rules en-
tertain a vast range of defenses, including arguments that are based on 
procedure rather than substance, unrelated to the merits of the claim, 
or valid in some courts but not others. It makes sense to handle forum 
selection the way we handle other arguments designed to channel liti-
gation. When a plaintiff’s suit is barred by a prior judgment, settle-
ment, or arbitral award, we protect the defendant through the ordi-
nary procedures for advancing defenses. Forum selection doesn’t need 
any heavier artillery than that. 
These procedures supplement rather than supplant the devices 
discussed in Atlantic Marine—namely § 1404 transfer and forum non 
conveniens. Both sets of remedies are available at once, and defend-
ants and courts can choose among them. If the legal system needs any 
new procedures, the right way to get them is to amend the Federal 
Rules. This Article concludes with some suggestions along those lines. 
But until we do that, we should use the Rules we have—under which 




 11.  Id. at 509; see also id. at 361 (defining “confession and avoidance” to include the plead-
ing of “additional facts that deprive the admitted facts of an adverse legal effect”). 
 12.  FED. R. CIV. P 8(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
 13.  Id. 56(a); see infra note 186 and accompanying text. 
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I.  FORUM SELECTION AS WAIVER 
This Article contends that forum selection is really a type of waiv-
er, grounded in the forum’s law of procedure, including federal proce-
dure. This claim is hardly obvious. For one thing, asking what forum 
selection “is really” might sound rather formalist: as a human artifact, 
forum selection is whatever we say it is, and many people don’t think 
of it as waiver. If our case law describes waiver as, say, “the ‘intention-
al relinquishment or abandonment of a known right,’”14 then small-
print forum selection clauses in adhesive contracts ain’t it.15 For an-
other, the courts are persistently divided about the law that governs a 
forum selection agreement, as well as the proper role of federal law 
when state law provides the rule of decision.16 If anything, given that 
forum selection clauses show up in contracts, it might seem obvious 
that they’re creatures of contract law—matters of substance, not pro-
cedure. 
This Part defends the view of forum selection as procedural waiv-
er. This defense isn’t intended as a normative one, broadly speaking; 
maybe the world would be a better place if forum selection agree-
ments were enforced as a matter of contract, or of state procedural 
law, or not at all. Nor is the defense narrowly descriptive, in the sense 
of predicting future behavior by courts or directly applying existing 
precedents. (After all, the courts are divided on the subject.) Instead, 
the argument is a doctrinal attempt to reconcile disparate strands of 
case law and to explain, in the face of judicial uncertainty, what view 
of forum selection best coheres with our other legal commitments. 
The argument that “forum selection is waiver” applies both to 
permissive agreements, which allow resort to a particular court, as 
well as to mandatory agreements, which bar the use of other courts. 
While the latter are generally more controversial, the basic argument 
in each case remains the same. Forum selection clauses might be 
found in contracts, but that doesn’t mean that their validity is deter-
mined by—let alone determined only by—substantive contract law. 
These contracts are for something unusual, namely the waiver of spe-
cific procedural rights. Only procedural law can tell us whether those 
rights are waivable and, if so, when. Should a forum selection agree-
 
 14.  Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1835 (2012) (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 
458 n.13 (2004)). 
 15.  Cf. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (enforcing such a clause). 
 16.  Compare Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2014) (federal law), 
with Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, 764 F.3d 765, 774–75 (7th Cir. 2014) (state law). 
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ment be invoked in federal court, moreover, the rights to be waived 
are federal rights. Only federal law can tell us, at least in the first in-
stance, whether and when parties can waive such rights ex ante.17 As a 
result, the proper law to govern forum selection in federal court is the 
law of federal procedure.18 
A.  Forum Selection as Attempted Waiver 
Agreeing to use a particular forum means waiving certain legal 
rights. In a permissive agreement, the parties waive their objections to 
litigating in a particular court. Personal jurisdiction and venue are 
standard examples of these objections, but there might be others too. 
What’s less well-recognized is that mandatory agreements, no less 
than permissive ones, also represent a form of waiver: they waive the 
parties’ rights to litigate in any other courts. 
Because these agreements concern the parties’ procedural rights, 
they necessarily involve issues of procedural law, not just contract. 
The point here is that not all “agreements” are “contracts”;19 or, to put 
it another way, not all agreements have their legal effect determined 
exclusively by contract law. Under the Federal Rules, when parties 
“agree” on discovery plans,20 “consent” to amended pleadings,21 or 
“stipulate” to bench trials,22 they may or may not have formed con-
tracts enforceable under state law. But they certainly have, through 
their voluntary actions, waived certain rights regarding the court’s 
procedures—rights on which they’d otherwise have been entitled to 
insist. Forum selection agreements work the same way. Functionally, 
they resemble stipulations more than ordinary contracts, and courts 
have even described them in those terms.23 These agreements may be 
found within contracts, they may be closely associated with contracts, 
 
 17.  The “at least in the first instance” reflects the fact that any federal law on the topic 
might, in turn, incorporate state law by reference. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 
U.S. 715, 718 (1979); Adam N. Steinman, Atlantic Marine Through the Lens of Erie, 66 
HASTINGS L.J. 795, 803–04 (2015). 
 18.  A separate issue concerns which law should be used to interpret forum selection 
agreements—as opposed to determining whether, once interpreted, they are valid and enforce-
able. This Article takes no view on the former question, which is discussed extensively in Kevin 
M. Clermont, Governing Law on Forum-Selection Agreements, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 643 (2015).  
 19.  I owe this phrasing to William Baude. 
 20.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2). 
 21.  Id. 15(a)(2). 
 22.  Id. 39(a)(1). 
 23.  Cf. Cent. Contracting Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 367 F.2d 341, 345 (3d Cir. 1966) (describing 
a forum selection clause as “merely constitut[ing] a stipulation,” whereby “the parties join in 
asking the court to give effect to their agreement”). 
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but fundamentally they’re not just contracts: they’re also matters of 
procedure. 
1.  Permissive Agreements 
In a permissive agreement, the parties agree to allow suits in a 
particular forum without trying to bar them elsewhere. At one level, 
we might view these agreements as contracts like any other. The par-
ties have made a promise to each other, and if one of them breaches 
its promise—say, by objecting to (or opposing transfer to) the forum it 
chose—then the promisee is entitled to some contractual remedy. 
What remedy is a harder question; a court might permit a separate 
suit for damages,24 it might grant specific performance by ignoring ju-
risdiction or venue objections,25 and so on. And maybe, as a matter of 
substantive contract law, these promises won’t be enforced at all. 
(Texas law, for instance, restricts the choice of an out-of-state forum 
when the contract concerns an in-state construction project.26) 
At the same time, permissive forum selection isn’t just a matter of 
contract. It also depends on the forum’s procedural law. Just as some 
substantive rights can’t be modified by contract—think of the right to 
be paid a minimum wage27 or to vote in a public election28—the same 
can be true of procedure. Subject-matter jurisdiction is the standard 
example;29 the parties can’t confer this jurisdiction on a court by pri-
vate agreement,30 any more than they can “oust” the jurisdiction of a 
court that already possesses it.31 So a promise to permit suit in a court 
without subject-matter jurisdiction will never be enforced with specif-
ic performance: the court can’t ignore the promisor’s jurisdictional ar-
gument, even if his making the argument is itself a form of breach.32 
 
 24.  See Dodson, Atlantic Marine, supra note 1, at 687. 
 25.  See Staring, supra note 2, at 409–11; cf. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 
1, 12 (1972) (describing an exclusive forum selection clause in such terms). 
 26.  TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 272.001 (Vernon 2011) (making such clauses voida-
ble by the party performing the construction). 
 27.  See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neill, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945). 
 28.  Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 597 (2012) (prohibiting expenditures for withholding votes); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 cmt. b (1981) (“[W]hen an agreement involves 
a serious crime or tort, [its] unenforceability is plain.”). 
 29.  See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (“[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction, 
because it involves a court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived.”); accord 
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). 
 30.  Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). 
 31.  See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972). 
 32.  Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). 
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And given that the promisee in such a case has no real right to expect 
performance, maybe damages should be unavailable too—just as they 
would be for breach of a promise to work at less than the minimum 
wage, or a promise not to vote.33 
In other words, to know whether a permissive agreement has legal 
effect, we can’t just look to the governing contract law; we need to 
know the procedural law too. While some procedural rules can’t be 
modified by agreement, others can. In federal courts, for example, 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant can be obtained by consent,34 
including consent expressed in a prior agreement.35 Venue objections 
can also be waived,36 before a dispute as well as after.37 If a party 
agrees to permit suit in a particular federal district, and is actually 
sued there, part of why the agreement “works” is that it’s understood 
to waive the defendant’s personal jurisdiction or venue objections, al-
lowing the suit to proceed in that forum. 
Courts don’t recognize these waivers because contract law some-
how trumps procedure, or because the parties are somehow entitled 
to override whatever the law actually requires.38 Rather, our proce-
dural law just happens to recognize a role for private understandings 
when allowing rights to be waived. Courts have sometimes permitted 
ex ante waivers of various rights relating to discovery, limitations pe-
riods, the admissibility of evidence, burdens of proof, jury trials, reme-
dies, cost- or fee-shifting, appeal rights, and so on;39 and, of course, par-
ties are also allowed to settle their underlying claims. People disagree 
on whether these procedural waivers are good or bad,40 just as they 
disagree about the merits of settlement.41 But for the moment, and 
 
 33.  Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 185 (“To the extent that a term requir-
ing the occurrence of a condition is unenforceable . . . , a court may excuse the non-occurrence 
of the condition unless its occurrence was an essential part of the agreed exchange.”). But cf. 
Emily L. Sherwin, Law and Equity in Contract Enforcement, 50 MD. L. REV. 253 (1991) (noting 
that many contracts unenforceable in equity may sometimes still be enforceable at law). 
 34.  Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 703. 
 35.  Id. at 704 (citing Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964)). 
 36.  Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343 (1960). 
 37.  Compare Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 441–44 (1946) (involving con-
sent before suit), with FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1) (providing that venue defenses are waived if not 
timely asserted). 
 38.  On parties trumping law, see generally Dodson, Atlantic Marine, supra note 1; Dod-
son, Party Subordinance, supra note 1. 
 39.  See Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party 
Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1343–51 (2012). 
 40.  See id. at 1333–34 & nn.21–24 (collecting sources). 
 41.  For canonical statements of the opposing positions, compare Owen M. Fiss, Against 
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984), with Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Con-
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subject to various conditions, permissive forum selection agreements 
usually succeed in waiving what the parties are trying to waive. 
2.  Mandatory Agreements 
Understanding permissive agreements as a form of waiver is easy 
enough. But mandatory agreements close courthouse doors rather 
than open them. At first glance, they might look less like waivers and 
more like contractual constraints. What rights, after all, could a man-
datory agreement waive? 
What mandatory agreements waive is the parties’ right to litigate 
in other courts. We usually don’t talk about the right to sue in a par-
ticular court as something separate and distinct from the right to sue 
in general. But as the Supreme Court explained in CompuCredit 
Corp. v. Greenwood, a statute might confer a substantive right and 
create a cause of action—granting a right to sue, in general—without 
conferring on the plaintiff an equal right to sue “in all competent 
courts.”42 In fact, even a nonwaivable substantive right needn’t imply 
“a nonwaivable right to initial judicial enforcement in any competent 
judicial tribunal” or “disabl[e] the parties from adopting a reasonable 
forum-selection clause.”43 It’s precisely because the right to sue in a 
particular court is distinct from the right to sue in general—and be-
cause the former may be waivable ex ante, even when the latter is 
not—that “the contemplated availability of all judicial forums may be 
reduced to a single forum by contractual specification.”44 
This isn’t as strange as it sounds, because the law often lets poten-
tial plaintiffs waive various litigation rights in advance. For example, 
they might agree to shorten the relevant time limits on a claim, there-
by waiving their otherwise-guaranteed rights to sue during the last 
portion of the statutory limitations period.45 Or they might agree to 
submit to a pre-suit examination under oath,46 effectively waiving 
their rights to file unverified complaints.47 Or they might agree to limit 
 
sent Judgments, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19. 
 42.  132 S. Ct. 665, 671 (2012). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  See Bone, supra note 39, at 1347 & n.73 (“Parties are free to shorten an applicable 
statute by agreement as long as the shorter period is reasonable.”); see also 31 RICHARD A. 
LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 79:10 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter WILLISTON]. But cf. Dod-
son, Party Subordinance, supra note 1, at 18 (questioning “what law”—other than the contrac-
tual condition—“authorizes such a dismissal”). 
 46.  See Pervis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 901 F.2d 944, 946–47 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 47.  Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a) (“Unless a rule or statute specifically states otherwise, a 
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the evidence that they’ll introduce48 or the remedies that they’ll seek.49 
Each of these represents an ex ante waiver of a particular litigation 
right that might otherwise be considered part of a general right to sue. 
These waivers can’t be analyzed as simple contract obligations. 
Some courts have described mandatory forum selection that way—as 
creating a “condition precedent to suit under the contract,” namely 
that the suit be brought in a particular place.50 But while the Supreme 
Court has sometimes used similar language, describing forum selec-
tion as a “contractual obligation”51 or a “contractual right,”52 it’s a very 
special kind of right—namely, a “right to limit trial to [a particular] fo-
rum.”53 Whether a contract succeeds in granting that right depends not 
only on contract law, but also on whether the plaintiff’s right to sue in 
other courts can lawfully be waived. Parties can write whatever condi-
tions precedent they want (say, that in order to recover, they have to 
abstain from voting in federal elections). But unless those conditions 
themselves are legally permissible, they’ll be unenforceable as against 
public policy, just as forum selection agreements were often held to be 
under the pre-Bremen regime.54 So whether a contract actually suc-
ceeds in requiring a certain forum isn’t just a question of contract. 
Viewing mandatory forum selection as a kind of waiver also 
makes more sense of the Court’s reworking of venue transfer in At-
lantic Marine. Ordinarily, as the Court noted, district courts consider-
ing a transfer (or a forum non conveniens dismissal) “evaluate both 
the convenience of the parties and various public-interest considera-
tions.”55 The parties to mandatory agreements “waive the right to chal-
lenge the preselected forum as inconvenient,” leaving the decision 
subject only to public-interest considerations.56 But according to the 
Court, that’s not all they waive. In an ordinary § 1404 transfer, the 
“state law applicable in the original court also appl[ies] in the trans-
feree court.”57 Under Atlantic Marine, though, a new choice of law is 
necessary; “[t]he court in the contractually selected venue should not 
 
pleading need not be verified or accompanied by an affidavit.”). 
 48.  See Bone, supra note 39, at 1349 & n.80. 
 49.  See id. at 1350 & nn.87–88. 
 50.  Marra v. Papandreou, 216 F.3d 1119, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 51.  Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 582 (2013). 
 52.  Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 499 (1989). 
 53.  Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 874 (1994). 
 54.  See 7 WILLISTON, supra note 45, § 15:15. 
 55.  Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581. 
 56.  Id. at 581 n.6, 582. 
 57.  Id. at 582. 
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apply the law of the transferor venue to which the parties waived 
their right.”58 In other words, even though the plaintiff otherwise had 
every right to sue in the transferor court, and even though jurisdiction 
and venue were perfectly proper, the agreement selecting the trans-
feree forum waived the plaintiff’s right to any other forum, and not 
just its right to raise certain arguments about convenience. By enter-
ing the agreement, the Court reasoned, the plaintiff “effectively exer-
cised” its traditional privilege to choose the forum, and so enjoyed no 
further privilege to choose a different one.59 
B.  Forum Selection and Forum Law 
Seeing forum selection as attempted waiver helps explain which 
law governs the attempt’s success or failure. Whether a given right can 
be waived depends in part on the law that confers it. We might look to 
contract law to identify the parties’ promises, but that’s not the only 
place to look. When the underlying rights relate to suit in particular 
courts (as opposed to the ability to recover in general), they’re con-
ferred by procedure, not substantive law. 
This has important consequences for choice of law, because the 
federal government and the several states often enforce forum selec-
tion agreements differently. While some courts have mistaken forum 
selection for a pure contract question, to be determined by whatever 
state’s substantive law “governs the rest of the contract in which the 
clause appears,”60 procedural questions are almost universally deter-
mined by forum law.61 Whether permissive or mandatory, a forum se-
lection agreement has its validity determined by the law of the forum. 
1.  Permissive Agreements 
To keep things simple, let’s start with state courts, avoiding for the 
moment any issues posed by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.62 Suppose 
that two parties in Texas form a permissive agreement, entitling each 
to sue the other in a Virginia forum. If that Virginia court would have 
 
 58.  Id. at 583. 
 59.  Id. at 582 (“[W]hen a plaintiff agrees by contract to bring suit only in a specified forum 
. . . the plaintiff has effectively exercised its ‘venue privilege’ before a dispute arises.” (quoting 
Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 635 (1964)); see also id. at 583 (“[A]s discussed above, a 
plaintiff who files suit in violation of a forum-selection clause enjoys no such ‘privilege’ with re-
spect to its choice of forum . . . .”). 
 60.  Abbott Labs. v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 476 F.3d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 61.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971); RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 585 (1934). 
 62.  304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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been available for these lawsuits anyway, then the parties’ agreement 
does no work; it simply preserves the status quo ante, under which 
they’d have been free to sue there or somewhere else. So the only case 
that matters is one in which the Virginia court would otherwise have 
been unavailable for some reason, but now might be available as a re-
sult of the permissive agreement. But if there’s some potential bar to 
the plaintiff’s filing in Virginia, we need to know what that bar is, and 
whether the agreement is enough to lift it—something that’s a ques-
tion of Virginia procedure, not Texas contract law. For instance, if the 
Virginia court thinks it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction even after the 
agreement, then it won’t hear the case—no matter how enforceable 
Texas contract law thinks the agreement ought to be. Only Virginia 
can define the jurisdiction of its own courts.63 
On the other hand, if Virginia thinks that (say) parties can consent 
to personal jurisdiction through an agreement like this one, then it 
doesn’t really matter whether Texas treats forum selection agree-
ments as valid or not. Regardless of whether the parties have a “con-
tract” as Texas defines the term, both of them signed a piece of paper 
that purported to consent to suit in Virginia. That fact, standing alone, 
might satisfy Virginia’s requirements for waiving jurisdiction or venue 
objections in its own courts. If a defendant manifested consent to ju-
risdiction by announcing it in an unsolicited letter, writing it in blood 
on the state capitol, hiring a skywriter to fly over the courthouse, or 
just shouting it from the rooftops at 3 a.m., that might be enough for 
Virginia’s courts—even if Texas contract law requires mutual assent, 
consideration, or a writing under the Statute of Frauds.64 Parties can 
waive legal arguments in lots of different ways, through many differ-
ent patterns of conduct, and not just through binding contracts.65 
At the same time, it’s hardly surprising that states might often 
choose to incorporate various aspects of the governing contract law. 
For instance, to decide whether an agent who signed an agreement ac-
tually had power to bind his principal, Virginia needn’t generate its 
own in-house law of “procedural agency”; it might just borrow what-
ever agency law governs the contract as a whole. And it might do the 
 
 63.  See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 314 (2006) (noting that jurisdiction is controlled 
“by the law of the court’s creation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 64.  Cf. Kim v. Son, No. G039818, 2009 WL 597232 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2009) (refusing 
to enforce a gratuitous promissory note written in blood). 
 65.  See, e.g., Democratic Republic of the Congo v. FG Hemisphere Assocs., 508 F.3d 1062, 
1064–65 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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same with principles of offer and acceptance (like the mailbox rule), 
novations, rescission, and so on. The whole point of contract law is to 
help us attach legal consequences to otherwise-empty promises, so it’s 
natural that we’d look to those doctrines when distinguishing loose 
words from real waivers. But just as we occasionally suspend our 
regular contract rules to make some promises atypically enforceable 
(say, in promissory estoppel) or atypically unenforceable (say, for pub-
lic policy reasons), so we might occasionally suspend our regular 
“whole law” of contracts when our procedural doctrines so require.66 
The exact balance between procedure and other sources of law—
and, in turn, between forum law and that of other states—not only 
depends on which forum we’re in, but also on the precise legal ques-
tion being asked and the precise remedy being sought. When the 
plaintiff sues in Virginia and the defendant asserts a lack of personal 
jurisdiction, what weight to give the forum selection agreement is an 
issue of Virginia personal jurisdiction law—at least to start with. 
When the plaintiff sues in Texas and the defendant wants a forum non 
conveniens dismissal, only Texas can say whether its courts recognize 
forum non conveniens at all, let alone what role the parties’ agree-
ment should play in administering it.67 And when a party wants to en-
force a forum selection agreement through other contractual reme-
dies (like damages for breach) that don’t require any change to the 
procedures, we need to look to the contract law that makes those 
remedies available. But none of this changes the fact that a permissive 
forum selection clause purports to waive certain procedural defenses 
in a particular forum, and whether it “works” to waive those defenses 
has to be determined by that forum’s procedural law. 
2.  Mandatory Agreements 
The case for applying forum law to mandatory agreements takes a 
little more explanation. If filing in the right court is a “condition prec-
edent to suit under the contract,”68 then that condition presumably 
operates anywhere the contract might be invoked. By disregarding it, 
 
 66.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (“A court usually applies 
its own local law rules prescribing how litigation shall be conducted even when it applies the lo-
cal law rules of another state to resolve other issues in the case.”). 
 67.  Though a forum non conveniens analysis in Texas might then cross-reference the law 
of other states—for instance, asking whether Virginia might be an adequate alternative forum, 
see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981), which depends in part on what 
Virginia courts will do. 
 68.  Marra v. Papandreou, 216 F.3d 1119, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
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a new forum would be unduly enlarging one party’s contract rights to 
the other’s disadvantage. Likewise, if the condition was invalid where 
formed, then perhaps it should be equally invalid everywhere, and so 
on. 
But on a closer examination, mandatory agreements look a lot 
more like permissive ones. Suppose that the two parties in Texas had 
agreed to sue only in Virginia—and that the plaintiff instead filed in 
Maine. Maybe every state would see Texas law as governing the con-
tract generally and determining the parties’ substantive rights. Yet 
Texas law can’t always control the list of courts in other states in 
which these rights will be enforced. That’s because the right to sue in 
some other state’s court is generally determined by that other state’s 
law. Under traditional conflicts doctrines, the “local law of the forum,” 
not the law governing the substance of the claim, “determines which 
of [the forum’s] courts, if any, may entertain an action on a claim in-
volving foreign elements.”69 The Maine court, acting under Maine’s 
law of procedure, may have proper jurisdiction over the parties and 
subject matter and be otherwise seised of the case, giving the plaintiff 
a perfectly good right to sue there. Whether and when that right is 
waivable ex ante depends, at least in part, on the Maine law that 
grants the right in the first place. In other words, even if a contract 
purported to make suit in the chosen forum a condition precedent to 
recovery, that condition might still be inconsistent with Maine’s public 
policy,70 just like a term claiming to oust the Maine courts of jurisdic-
tion. 
Alternatively, suppose that Texas law would call this contractual 
condition invalid—say, because it showed up in a construction con-
tract, wasn’t in writing, lacked consideration, etc. In that case, it might 
lack force as a “contract,” but it still might have force as a waiver. Just 
as Maine can adopt its own statute of limitations to guard against 
stale claims,71 or its own doctrines of “unclean hands” to prevent its 
 
 69.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 123; accord RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 586 (1934); cf. id. § 617 (“An action can be maintained on a 
foreign cause of action although by the law of the state which created the right, it is required 
that suit shall not be brought outside the state.”). 
 70.  See supra text accompanying notes 50–54; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT 
OF LAWS § 6 (including as “factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law” any “rel-
evant policies of the forum”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612 cmt. a (de-
scribing “the procedural policy of the forum” as “requir[ing] the courts to apply certain local 
rules in the course of the litigation to enforce the local notions concerning the manner and 
method in which the courts of that state should function”). 
 71.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 142–143 (1971); 
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courts from becoming instruments of injustice,72 so too it can adopt its 
own understanding of civil waiver (absent some federal override),73 
and find “justice [to be] served by holding parties to their bargain.”74 
As in CompuCredit, Texas’s mere choice to create a cause of action 
doesn’t automatically “guarantee suit in all competent courts.”75 Even 
if Texas tried to guarantee suit in other courts, it couldn’t make good 
on that guarantee when those courts are found in other states. Maine 
courts might respect a Texas guarantee, but then again they might not; 
the answer depends on forum procedure. 
In fact, were we inclined to treat the forum selection agreement as 
purely contractual, we’d still need to look to Maine law to know how 
to enforce it. Assuming that the contract were otherwise valid, a de-
fendant trying to bar suit in Maine would be seeking a particular kind 
of remedy for breach, namely specific performance of a promise not 
to sue there.76 But while the validity of a contract, in general, might 
depend on another state’s law, “whether equitable remedies . . . are 
available” for breach—and, if so, which ones—is traditionally deter-
mined by “[t]he local law of the forum.”77 So here, too, forum law con-
trols. 
C.  Forum Selection and Federal Law 
Turning from state to federal courts complicates matters greatly. 
Erie and its progeny generally require federal courts, when not decid-
ing matters of state law, to act like state courts in the states in which 
they sit.78 Is the validity of a forum selection agreement a matter of 
federal law, or do the federal courts have to copy state practice? The 
Supreme Court has long avoided the question,79 the courts of appeals 
 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 603–604 (1934). 
 72.  See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 601. 
 73.  E.g., Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729 (2009) (Supremacy Clause); Hughes v. Fetter, 
341 U.S. 609 (1951) (Full Faith and Credit Clause). 
 74.  Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 583 (2013) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 75.  CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 671 (2012). 
 76.  See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972) (describing the issue as 
whether the district court should have “specifically enforc[ed] the forum selection clause”); see 
also Staring, supra note 2, at 410–11. 
 77.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 131 cmt. a (1971); see also 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 590 cmt. a (same rule for “injunction[s]”).  
 78.  See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (citing Erie R.R. 
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74–77 (1938)). 
 79.  See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581 n.5; Stephen E. Sachs, Five Questions After Atlantic 
Marine, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 761, 766–68 (2015). 
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are divided on it,80 and scholarly commentators are no less split.81 
There’s a reason for this: as Erie questions go, this one is particularly 
difficult. But if forum selection is really about procedure, then the 
case for federal law may be stronger than we thought. 
1.  Why the Problem Is Hard 
The first thing to note is that this problem is a hard one: the “ob-
vious” arguments for either side generally misfire. On the one hand, 
it’s not enough to argue, as the Seventh Circuit has done, that forum 
selection agreements are part of contracts, and that “[t]here is no gen-
eral federal law of contracts after Erie.”82 As explained at length 
above, whether parties can waive procedural rights in advance is an is-
sue of procedure, not just contract. The Seventh Circuit has made the 
same argument—and the same error—with regard to waivers of the 
federal right to jury trial. There, the right itself is clearly federal in na-
ture (guaranteed by the Constitution and the Federal Rules),83 and 
federal courts often permit ex ante waiver, as a matter of federal ra-
ther than state law.84 The Seventh Circuit found it “inconsistent[]” to 
use federal “standards of ‘waiver’” to assess “components of other-
wise-valid contracts” governed by state law.85 But it’s not quite so 
 
 80.  The Seventh Circuit takes the agreement’s validity as governed by state law, namely 
“the law of the jurisdiction whose law governs the rest of the contract in which the clause ap-
pears.” Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, 764 F.3d 765, 774–75 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Abbott Labs. 
v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 476 F.3d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 2007)). But many other circuits favor federal 
law instead. See, e.g., Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2014); Albemarle 
Corp. v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 628 F.3d 643, 650 (4th Cir. 2010); Wong v. Party-Gaming Ltd., 
589 F.3d 821, 827 (6th Cir. 2009); Fru-Con Constr. Corp. v. Controlled Air, Inc., 574 F.3d 527, 
538 (8th Cir. 2009); Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F. 3d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009); Ginter ex rel. Bal-
lard v. Belcher, Prendergast & Laporte, 536 F.3d 439, 441 (5th Cir. 2008); P & S Bus. Machs., 
Inc. v. Canon USA, Inc., 331 F.3d 804, 807 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). 
 81.  Compare, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Gaming the System: Protecting Consumers from Un-
conscionable Contractual Forum Selection and Arbitration Clauses, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 719, 732 
(2015) [hereinafter Mullenix, Gaming the System] (suggesting that state law applies under Erie 
and Klaxon), Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual 
Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 314–15 (1988) [hereinafter 
Mullenix, Another Choice] (same), and Steinman, supra note 17, at 804–10, 818–19 (same), with 
Clermont, supra note 18, at 666 (arguing that federal interests in forum selection “should pre-
vail”), and Julia L. Erickson, Comment, Forum Selection Clauses in Light of the Erie Doctrine 
and Federal Common Law: Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corporation, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1090, 
1092 (1988) (endorsing “limited federal common law”). 
 82.  IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 991–92 (7th 
Cir. 2008). 
 83.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; FED. R. CIV. P. 38–39. 
 84.  See, e.g., Telum, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1988); 
Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832–33 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 85.  IFC Credit, 512 F.3d at 994. 
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strange, when dealing with a right “essential” to the federal system,86 
to use federal standards to decide whether and when the right can be 
waived. So the fact that contract law is generally state law, not feder-
al,87 doesn’t tell us what we need to know. 
On the other hand, despite what many courts have held, labels like 
“procedure” don’t answer the question either.88 The Rules Enabling 
Act differentiates between “procedure” and “substantive right[s],”89 
but those words don’t show up in the Rules of Decision Act,90 which 
applies in the absence of a Federal Rule.91 Under that statute, federal 
courts have to use state laws as rules of decision in all “cases where 
they apply.”92 And the law that “appl[ies]” to a procedural question 
has frequently been held, rightly or wrongly, to be the law of the fo-
rum state—whether the question involves limitations periods,93 the 
powers of judges and juries,94 or even choice of law itself.95 So the issue 
we’re left with is whether a federal court in, say, the District of Maine 
can enforce an independent federal doctrine of forum selection, or 
whether it has to borrow Maine procedures and ensure consistency 
with Maine’s courts. 
 
 
 86.  Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958), 
 87.  See Mullenix, Another Choice, supra note 81, at 314–15. 
 88.  See, e.g., Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 220 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Questions of 
venue and the enforcement of forum selection clauses are essentially procedural, rather than 
substantive, in nature, and therefore should be governed by federal law.” (emphasis and internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 89.  28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b) (2012). 
 90.  Id. § 1652. 
 91.  See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1448 
(2010). 
 92.  28 U.S.C. § 1652. 
 93.  Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 603–604 (1934) (treating 
statutes of limitations as procedural matters governed by forum law), and RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 142–143 (1971) (retaining much of this rule), with Guar. 
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945) (requiring federal courts to use the limitations periods 
of the states in which they sit). 
 94.  Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 129 (“The local law of 
the forum determines whether an issue shall be tried by the court or by a jury.”), and 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 592 (same), with Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humani-
ties, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (requiring federal judges to use state standards when reviewing ju-
ry awards).  
 95.  Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 (describing conflict of 
laws as “part of the law of each state” that might hear a case), and RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7 (same), with Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 
(1941) (requiring federal courts to borrow state choice-of-law principles). 
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2.  The Case for Federal Law 
Notwithstanding the question’s difficulty, it still has an answer: 
namely, that federal law determines validity. That answer might seem 
surprising. On the modern Erie analysis, there’s a strong argument for 
conformity with state procedure. When there’s no controlling federal 
statute or enacted rule, we have to “wade into Erie’s murky waters,”96 
deciding whether the “twin aims” identified in Hanna v. Plumer—
“discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable 
administration of the laws”—favor state law.97 As both judges and 
scholars have noted, different rules on forum selection could easily 
lead to different results in different courts and among different par-
ties.98 If the state court would reject an agreement while the federal 
court would accept it, then who wins or loses the case might come 
down to the “accident of diversity jurisdiction.”99 So, the argument 
goes, state procedure necessarily applies—or, to say mostly the same 
thing, the federal court ought to enforce a federal common law rule 
that incorporates state law by reference.100 
But this modern analysis isn’t the only one. The Supreme Court 
has also recognized a range of “countervailing federal interests” that 
can justify independent federal rules.101 Forum selection clearly impli-
cates those interests, and the federal courts regularly apply their own 
set of independent rules. And while the Supreme Court occasionally 
borrows state standards as a matter of policy, there are strong policy 
as well as structural arguments for an independent federal standard 
governing the right to a federal forum. 
a.  Forum Selection and Federal Interests 
To start with, it should be “plain that the Federal Government’s 
interest . . . is implicated” by a forum selection agreement that affects 
federal litigation, “even though the dispute is one between private 
parties.”102 A permissive agreement, for example, attempts to lift a 
procedural bar to suit in a given court. To know whether it succeeds, 
 
 96.  Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437. 
 97.  380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
 98.  See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 37–38 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Steinman, supra note 17, at 804–08. 
 99.  Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 751 (2012). 
 100.  See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 718 (1979); Steinman, su-
pra note 17, at 810. 
 101.  Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996). 
 102.  Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 506 (1988). 
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we need to know what kind of bar we’re talking about; and if the bar 
itself comes from federal law, then federal law ordinarily specifies the 
conditions under which it lifts. If the parties chose a federal court that 
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, for instance, it’d be obvious that 
state rules on forum selection wouldn’t matter; the jurisdiction of any 
court is always “determined by the law of the court’s creation.”103 
Similarly, a mandatory agreement that promised to sue only in 
certain courts—say, those located in Virginia—necessarily includes a 
promise not to sue in other courts, including otherwise-appropriate 
federal courts in Maine. That kind of promise is a natural subject for 
federal regulation, just like a promise not to vote in certain federal 
elections for which the party might otherwise be legally eligible. (The 
parties’ agreement might not mention federal courts specifically, but 
that doesn’t mean much; a promise to vote “only in Virginia municipal 
elections” clearly includes a promise not to vote in federal ones, and 
would be just as illegal to procure.104) 
According to the Supreme Court, this kind of federal interest is “a 
necessary, [but] not a sufficient, condition for the displacement of 
state law.”105 We still need to know whether state law creates any “sig-
nificant conflict” with “an identifiable federal policy” on the topic.106 If 
“there can be no other law” to apply, then state law wins by default.107 
As it happens, though, there is other law here, namely the standards of 
waiver that federal courts apply in cases involving purely federal is-
sues. In fact, there are multiple such standards. Waivers of federal con-
stitutional rights, for example, face a “‘high standar[d]’” of being 
“knowing, intelligent, and voluntary”;108 but waivers of less vital rights 
are handled in a different way. As to permissive agreements, the Court 
considered it “settled” half a century ago “that parties to a contract 
may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court, to 
permit notice to be served by the opposing party, or even to waive no-
tice altogether.”109 And as to mandatory ones, when the forum selec-
 
 103.  Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 314 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104.  See 18 U.S.C. § 597 (2012). 
 105.  Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507. 
 106.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 107.  Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 37 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Han-
na v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471–72 (1965)). 
 108.  Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1219 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966)). 
 109.  Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315–16 (1964). But cf. id. at 332 
(Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that “a printed form provision buried in a multitude of words” 
may be “too weak . . . to be treated as a waiver of so important a constitutional safeguard”). 
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tion issue is entirely out of the state’s hands (in admiralty cases, for 
example), the federal courts will enforce the agreement if it’s “unaf-
fected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power,” 
and if it’s neither “unreasonable” nor “unjust.”110 Assuming that these 
practices are correct—they may not be—there’s a significant potential 
for conflict between state and federal law. 
b.  The Merits of a Federal Standard 
One might think, given this conflict, that the analysis should be 
simple. Either the states have power to regulate here—in which case 
their law controls—or they don’t, and some separate standard has to 
govern instead. “[B]y definition,” Caleb Nelson has written, “‘federal’ 
common law operates only where something has displaced or restrict-
ed the states’ lawmaking powers.”111 In the forum selection context, 
that “something” is the federal right to a federal forum, which state 
law can neither extend nor deny. With respect to permissive agree-
ments, for example, to say that state law conclusively determines the 
agreement’s validity is to say that a state, by legislation, can force a 
federal court to take a case it finds otherwise barred by the federal 
law of jurisdiction or venue—or can prevent a federal court from lift-
ing the bar, when it’d be otherwise inclined to do so. Letting the state 
decide might make sense if the bar itself were a creature of state law. 
But when the bar is federal, it’s hard to see where the state gets this 
power—“a right,” as M‘Culloch v. Maryland put it, “in one govern-
ment to pull down, what there is an acknowledged right in another to 
build up; . . . a right in one government to destroy, what there is a right 
in another to preserve.”112 A few years later, in Wayman v. Southard, 
Chief Justice Marshall explicitly rejected the idea that states could 
“control the modes of proceeding in suits depending in the Courts of 
the United States,” something “[n]o gentleman, we believe, will be so 
extravagant as to maintain.”113 
 
 
 110.  The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12, 15 (1972); accord Carnival Cruise 
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–94 (1991) (clarifying that forum selection clauses in form 
contracts are subject to the same standards). 
 111.  Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal Common Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 
(2015). 
 112.  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159, 210 (1819). 
 113.  23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 49 (1825); cf. Michael S. Green, Vertical Power, 48 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 73, 88 (2014) (arguing that it is “impermissible for state officials to [regulate federal 
procedure] indirectly, by taking laws that apply to their own courts and extending them to fed-
eral courts within the state”). 
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Under the modern Erie analysis, though, the Supreme Court has 
claimed for itself the right to “adopt[], as the federally prescribed rule 
of decision, the law that would be applied by state courts,” unless 
there’s a “need for a uniform federal rule.”114 In other words, while the 
law of federal forum selection has to be federal, it might copy state-
law standards within each state, so long as the Court thinks that that’s 
a good idea. Borrowing state law has the advantage of unifying the re-
sults between diverse and nondiverse parties, and between various 
courts located in the same state. What advantages does a uniform fed-
eral rule confer? 
i. Policy.—On a superficial level, a single federal standard has a 
number of policy advantages. Hanna’s language about the “discour-
agement of forum-shopping”115 seems rather out of place when the 
whole issue is about selecting a forum. The Bremen specifically en-
couraged federal courts to enforce ex ante agreements like these to 
help the parties avoid surprises. But “[t]he elimination of all such un-
certainties by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both par-
ties”116 is simply impossible if the agreement itself might have to be 
reviewed under any of fifty different state standards. Indeed, the fact 
that the parties might specifically choose to litigate only in state 
courts, or only in federal ones, makes it far less necessary for those 
state or federal courts to handle the issues the same way. (An agree-
ment not to remove to federal court, for example, could only be rele-
vant in a federal forum, so it’s not clear a state court needs any opin-
ion at all on what should happen once it’s invoked.) 
On this Article’s approach, moreover, there’s less to be feared 
from a divergence between state and federal courts within the same 
state. Suppose the parties have a mandatory agreement excluding all 
courts in a given state, which the federal court there would honor but 
which a state court would ignore. If, as explained below, the federal 
court would dismiss an action filed contrary to the agreement, then 
the plaintiff could simply refile in state court. If the defendant tried to 
remove, the plaintiff could seek remand or forum non conveniens 
dismissal in favor of the state court in which, by assumption, he had 
not waived his right to sue.117 (The federal court would have no inter-
 
 114.  Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001); see also United 
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 718 (1979). 
 115.  Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
 116.  The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13. 
 117.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2012) (discussing motions to remand on bases other than sub-
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est in keeping the case away from the state court; waiver is forum law, 
after all, and the plaintiff hadn’t waived any right to sue there.118) In 
other words, both court systems could fully implement their policies 
at one and the same time; the very structure of forum-selection-as-
waiver can often make divergence between state and federal courts a 
non-issue. 
The same goes for the other “aim[] of the Erie rule,” the “avoid-
ance of inequitable administration of the laws.”119 The usual worry 
here is that, in practice, too much of the parties’ legal relationship will 
rest on the “accident of diversity jurisdiction.”120 But forum selection 
only arises as a federal issue if the agreement applies to federal courts 
in particular. The parties could always agree to sue or not to sue in 
particular state courts, while wholly disclaiming any effect on federal 
courts; in that case, their agreement wouldn’t ever be relevant in a 
federal forum, as it would have deliberately exempted federal courts 
from its scope. We only get started with the Erie question once the 
parties have made an agreement that addresses the federal courts in 
particular. (Again, we wouldn’t need any explicit reference to the fed-
eral system, any more than a contract to vote “in Virginia municipal 
elections only” needs to explicitly mention federal elections in order 
to rule them out.) 
In other words, to make a forum selection agreement relevant to 
federal courts, the parties have to make a particular choice whether or 
not to specify a federal forum. But the only parties who could possibly 
make such an agreement are those whose claims might be eligible for 
federal jurisdiction in the first place; a promise regarding litigation in 
federal courts is meaningless if the parties couldn’t litigate there any-
way. So the standard assumption underlying Erie, that diverse and 
nondiverse parties are similarly situated, no longer applies. If diversity 
is the only reason why a party has a right to a federal forum, then di-
versity can explain the use of federal standards for whether and when 
that right is waived. There’s nothing accidental about it. 
 
ject-matter jurisdiction); 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3721, at 97–98 & nn.140–141 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing remands to enforce waiv-
ers of the right to remove); see also Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 
580 (2013) (endorsing forum non conveniens dismissal in favor of state or foreign courts). 
 118.  And if the federal court sends the case elsewhere under § 1404, it does so only accord-
ing to federal statutory standards, which take independent account of the parties’ desires. See 
Sachs, supra note 79, at 769–71. 
 119.  Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. 
 120.  Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 751 (2012). 
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ii. Structure.—On a deeper level, there are strong structural rea-
sons for the federal courts to maintain an independent standard for 
identifying waiver. As the Court has reminded us, “[t]he federal sys-
tem is an independent system for administering justice to litigants 
who properly invoke its jurisdiction.”121 When ordinary tests might call 
for state law, the federal judiciary can still follow its own standards to 
preserve an “essential characteristic of that system.”122 How to allocate 
cases across federal districts might not seem quite as “essential” as 
how to “distribute[] trial functions between judge and jury,”123 the 
most famous example of this kind. But it’s a distinctively federal func-
tion, one arguably “committed by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States to federal control.”124 
In a permissive agreement, for example, defendants might agree to 
waive their federal venue objections. Those kinds of objections are 
uniquely federal. States may or may not have any analogues to venue, 
and such analogues needn’t resemble the lines between federal dis-
tricts. In that case, the direct adoption of state standards would be im-
possible. Or the parties might consent to personal jurisdiction in the 
federal courts, whether or not they similarly consent to the jurisdic-
tion of state courts. When the Supreme Court approved ex ante waiv-
ers of personal jurisdiction, for instance, it did so based on “general 
principles,” refusing to “assume that this uniform federal standard 
should give way to contrary local policies.”125 
With respect to mandatory agreements, the conflict between state 
and federal standards becomes even sharper. These standards might 
differ in one of two ways: either a state court might enforce the 
agreement when a federal court wouldn’t, or the other way around. 
When the state is the one favoring enforcement, it’s hard to see 
how its preferences could lawfully interfere with a federal case. Imag-
ine a mandatory forum selection agreement that fails The Bremen’s 
standards—one that’s unjust and unreasonable, that resulted from 
overweening bargaining power (say, a gun to the plaintiff’s head), and 
so on. Maybe the state courts would enforce it anyway; but a federal 
court, seised with jurisdiction and proper venue, couldn’t say that the 
plaintiff had waived its federal right to litigate in the federal forum. 
 
 121.  Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958). 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988). 
 125.  Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964). 
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One “essential characteristic”126 of the federal system is that its courts 
“in the main ‘have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction 
which is given, then to usurp that which is not given.’”127 How and 
when they’ll step back from their “virtually unflagging obligation . . . 
to exercise the jurisdiction given them”128 is a question of federal law. 
No state can stop a federal court from deciding a case within its juris-
diction, even by enacting a statute to that effect.129 Nor can a state 
make an end-run around this rule by declaring the plaintiff to have 
“waived” its right to a federal forum, and then expecting federal 
courts to follow along. 
The other possibility is that state courts might reject agreements 
that federal courts would accept as fair. For instance, a state might dis-
regard forum selection entirely, or might limit it in particular fields 
(such as construction)—ignoring bargains between sophisticated par-
ties that were neither unjust nor unreasonable, that were freely nego-
tiated on a level playing field, and that involved one party making 
permanent commitments in exchange for another’s promise.130 If a 
plaintiff “flouts” that promise,131 is the federal court supposed to ig-
nore this unfairness, simply because the state courts would do so? 
In many Erie cases, the answer is “yes,” because the federal court 
is obliged to enforce state law. But federal courts typically use federal 
law to define their own inherent powers, as these are beyond the 
states’ power to abridge, enlarge, or modify. For example, the Supreme 
Court has recognized as a general “principle” that “a court may resist 
imposition upon its jurisdiction”—for instance, when a plaintiff might 
“‘vex,’ ‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the defendant” by suing in an improper 
place, “inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to [the 
plaintiff’s] own right to pursue his remedy.”132 Forum non conveniens 
doctrine is theoretically based on this inherent power to prevent vexa-
 
 126.  Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537. 
 127.  Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 747 (2012) (quoting Cohens v. Virgin-
ia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)). 
 128.  Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). 
 129.  See Chi. & N.W. R.R. Co. v. Whitton, 80 U.S. 270, 286 (1871); accord Marshall v. Mar-
shall, 547 U.S. 293, 313–14 (2006); Verity Winship, Bargaining for Exclusive State Court Jurisdic-
tion, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 51, 68 (2012). 
 130.  Cf. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 582 (2013) (noting that 
the plaintiff’s agreement to a forum selection clause is typically given “in exchange for other 
binding promises by the defendant”). 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507–08 (1947); accord Sibaja v. Dow Chem. 
Co., 757 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 1985). 
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tious or oppressive litigation.133 And while the Supreme Court has 
never decided the Erie issue,134 federal courts routinely apply this fed-
eral version of forum non conveniens as opposed to any conflicting 
state doctrines.135 Likewise, the substantial majority of circuits treat 
the doctrine of judicial estoppel—which the Court has described as 
necessary “to protect the integrity of the judicial process”136—as a 
matter of federal law for Erie purposes, even when state law governs 
the substance of the claim.137 The federal courts’ ability to resist impo-
sitions seems to be another “essential” aspect of their “independent 
system,”138 one that it’s hard to imagine them subcontracting out to 
the states to decide. 
These inherent-powers doctrines bear a strong resemblance to fo-
rum-related waiver, which is also designed to prevent a party from 
playing “fast and loose” with the courts and misusing the availability 
of a federal forum.139 As the Court put it in Atlantic Marine, the point 
of enforcing a forum selection agreement isn’t that it always has the 
force of a state-law contract, but that the parties’ bargain “represents 
[their] agreement as to the most proper forum,”140 which affects “their 
legitimate expectations” as well as “vital interests of the justice sys-
 
 133.  See, e.g., Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 507–08; Sibaja, 757 F.2d at 1218. 
 134.  See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 n.13 (1981). 
 135.  See DTEX, LLC v. BBVA Bancomer, S.A., 508 F.3d 785, 793 (5th Cir. 2007); Esfeld v. 
Costa Crociere, S.P.A., 289 F.3d 1300, 1315 (11th Cir. 2002); Caribbean Wholesales & Serv. 
Corp. v. U.S. JVC Corp., 24 F. App’x 16, 18 (2d Cir. 2001); Ravelo Monegro v. Rosa, 211 F.3d 
509, 511–12 (9th Cir. 2000); Rivendell Forest Prods., Ltd. v. Can. Pac. Ltd., 2 F.3d 990, 992 (10th 
Cir. 1993); Royal Bed & Spring Co. v. Famossul Industria e Comercio de Moveis Ltda., 906 F.2d 
45, 50 (1st Cir. 1990); Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 316 (6th Cir. 1974); 14D WRIGHT ET AL., su-
pra note 117, § 3828.5, at 726 (4th ed. 2013). But see Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 
YALE L.J. 1935 (1991) (arguing for state law). 
 136.  New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (quoting Edwards v. Aetna Life 
Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1982)). 
 137.  See, e.g., Vehicle Mkt. Research, Inc. v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., 767 F.3d 987, 993 (10th Cir. 
2014); Wells v. Coker, 707 F.3d 756, 760 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 94 (2013); Milton H. 
Greene Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn Monroe LLC, 692 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 2012); G-I Holdings, 
Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 247, 261 (3d Cir. 2009); In re Ark-La-Tex Timber Co., Inc., 
482 F.3d 319, 332 n.18 (5th Cir. 2007); Pennycuff v. Fentress County Bd. of Educ., 404 F.3d 447, 
452 (6th Cir. 2005); Lowery v. Stovall, 92 F.3d 219, 223 n.3 (4th Cir. 1996). That said, there is a 
long-standing circuit split on the issue, as some courts apply state law on judicial estoppel in-
stead. See Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. v. Soczynski, 765 F.3d 931, 935 n.3 (8th Cir. 2014); Origi-
nal Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. S. Diamond Assocs., Inc., 44 F.3d 925, 930 (11th Cir. 1995); 
Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 937–38 (D.C. Cir. 1980); cf. Perry v. Blum, 629 F.3d 1, 8 
(1st Cir. 2010) (describing the issue as still open in the First Circuit). 
 138.  Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958). 
 139.  New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 140.  Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 (2013) (quoting Stewart 
Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31 (1988)). 
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tem.”141 Letting a party “flout[]”142 a prior agreement, through the spe-
cific mechanism of filing a suit in a federal court, may well be the kind 
of “perversion of the judicial process” that federal courts can legiti-
mately guard against through their own federal standards for waiv-
er.143 
c.  The Federal Standards We Have 
Where these unwritten waiver standards come from—whether 
they’re proclaimed by federal courts like mini-legislatures,144 or 
whether they have to be derived from preexisting rules of common 
law or equity145—is a more complex topic than can be addressed here. 
And none of this reasoning tells us what those unwritten standards 
actually are; that is, what kinds of conduct actually cause a party to 
waive its rights, to what extent these standards incorporate whatever 
substantive contract law would otherwise apply, and so on. This Arti-
cle holds no brief for any particular set of standards, and federal 
waiver law has been extensively criticized on normative grounds—as 
“a patchwork of concepts drawn from jurisdiction, venue, forum non 
conveniens[,] and contract law,” lacking in “conceptual clarity,” and 
“plagued by linguistic and analytical difficulties.”146 
Indeed, some criticisms of the use of federal law in forum selec-
tion have been primarily focused on substance, not federalism. Their 
central claim is that the federal standard developed in The Bremen, 
and especially as applied to consumer contracts in Carnival Cruise 
Lines Inc. v. Shute,147 is too quick to enforce unfair agreements made 
by unsophisticated parties.148 True or not, that claim lacks any clear re-
lationship to the Erie question. If the difference went the other way—
if the federal courts had stuck to their pre-Bremen jurisprudence, ex-
ercising their statutory jurisdiction to its full extent—it’s hard to imag-
ine a similar Erie critique even getting started. (With the federal 
 
 141.  Id. (quoting Stewart, 487 U.S. at 33 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 142.  Id. at 582. 
 143.  New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750 (quoting In re Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 
1990)). 
 144.  Cf. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (describing “so-
called ‘federal common law’” as being “prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the 
courts”). 
 145.  See generally Nelson, supra note 111; Stephen E. Sachs, The “Unwritten Constitution” 
and Unwritten Law, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1797; Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813 (2012). 
 146.  See Mullenix, Another Choice, supra note 81, at 360, 365, 370. 
 147.  499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
 148.  See generally Mullenix, Gaming the System, supra note 81. 
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courts standing ready to exercise their jurisdiction, how could a state’s 
law take the case away?) 
But whatever the applicable federal standards are, the fact that 
they’re unwritten shouldn’t give us pause. Sometimes procedural rules 
like these are codified,149 but they don’t have to be—and, in the feder-
al system, they usually aren’t.150 That personal jurisdiction and venue 
“are personal privileges of the defendant, rather than absolute stric-
tures on the court, and both may be waived by the parties,”151 is just 
something that competent practitioners and judges know, and not 
something that statutes had to tell us. Whether those standards are 
written or unwritten, forum selection involves “uniquely federal in-
terests,”152 and it needs to be assessed under federal law. 
II.  FORUM SELECTION AS DEFENSE 
Recognizing that forum selection is a type of waiver helps explain 
how the issue should come before a federal court. For permissive 
agreements, the procedure is usually simple; whatever objections the 
defendant has waived just go away. For mandatory agreements, 
though, the matter is often more complex. In one common scenario, a 
plaintiff subject to a mandatory forum selection agreement nonethe-
less files in a court other than the one the parties chose. Atlantic Ma-
rine identified two “appropriate” means of responding: a motion to 
transfer venue among federal districts under § 1404, or a motion to 
dismiss in favor of a state or foreign court under forum non conven-
iens.153 
Fortunately, though, the Court left the door open to other proce-
dures.154 If forum selection is really a type of waiver, then a mandatory 
agreement waiving the right to sue in a given forum ought to serve as 
a defense to recovery there, and it ought to be asserted like any other 
defense—affirmatively stated in the answer or raised by appropriate 
motion. At least three circuit courts of appeals have adopted this ap-
 
 149.  See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1402 (McKinney 2010) (declaring valid certain 
contracts’ choices of New York courts and New York law). 
 150.  But cf. Dodson, Atlantic Marine, supra note 1, at 687–88 (arguing that beyond § 1404, 
“no codified law appears to allow ex ante waiver” in federal courts); accord Shannon, supra 
note 9, at 786 n.49 (questioning the grounds for ex ante waiver). 
 151.  Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979). 
 152.  Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (quoting Texas Indus., Inc. v. 
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981)). 
 153.  Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 580–81 (2013). 
 154.  See id. at 580 & n.4; see also Sachs, supra note 79, at 763–64. 
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proach (or something like it),155 as has the Wright & Miller treatise,156 
and it has both theoretical and practical advantages over its competi-
tors. And while nothing’s perfect, any problems that result from rec-
ognizing forum selection as a defense can be corrected through 
straightforward amendments to the Federal Rules. 
A.  Why Forum Selection Is a Defense 
Viewing a mandatory forum selection agreement as a defense fol-
lows rather naturally from viewing it as a waiver. A plaintiff that’s 
given up the right to sue in a particular forum shouldn’t be allowed to 
recover there. Otherwise, the waiver doesn’t mean very much. The 
fact that this is a forum “to which the parties waived their right”157 is a 
reason why the plaintiff should go home without relief. That’s the 
classic definition of a defense: a reason why this particular court, at 
this particular time, shouldn’t award the relief that the plaintiff 
seeks.158 
The same reasoning applies even if Part I of this Article were en-
tirely wrong, and a mandatory forum selection agreement—which, for 
simplicity’s sake, this Part just calls “forum selection”—were purely a 
matter of contract. If the parties have a binding contract not to litigate 
in a particular forum, and the plaintiff files there anyway, then the 
court ought to award some kind of remedy for that breach. Often the 
proper remedy, as a matter of equity, will be specific performance of 
their obligation not to litigate—which is usually achieved by prevent-
ing the plaintiff from continuing the suit.159 Either way, the forum se-
lection agreement serves as a reason why the plaintiff should lose. 
In fact, from the standpoint of contract law, specific performance 
makes far more sense than subsequent claims for damages.160 Part of 
the problem is that, in the forum selection context, the standard rem-
 
 155.  See, e.g., Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan, 769 F.3d 922, 933–34 (6th Cir. 2014); Rive-
ra v. Centro Médico de Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2009); Salovaara v. Jackson Nat’l 
Life Ins. Co., 246 F.3d 289, 298–99 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 156.  See 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 135, § 3803.1, at 93 & n.82 (4th ed. 2013) (“The 
better view . . . is that a [valid] forum selection clause . . . should be enforced by either a Section 
1404(a) transfer or a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”) (citing cases). 
 157.  Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 583. 
 158.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 509 (defining “defense”). 
 159.  See generally Staring, supra note 2; see also The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 
U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (“The correct approach would have been to enforce the forum clause specifi-
cally . . . .”). 
 160.  Cf. Dodson, Atlantic Marine, supra note 1, at 677 (discussing contract actions after 
breach). 
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edy of expectation damages is very uncertain. If the plaintiff sues 
somewhere other than the chosen forum, how much has the defend-
ant really lost in dollar terms? Would the defendant need to prove (by 
a preponderance of evidence) that the case would have come out dif-
ferently in the chosen court?161 How much should we weigh the uncer-
tainty caused by the change, the defendant’s unfamiliarity with proce-
dures or personnel, the need to find a lawyer admitted to the court’s 
bar, the potential differences in choice of law, and so on? When a 
damages remedy “affords inadequate protection” against the other 
party’s deliberate breach, we often impose a disgorgement remedy in-
stead, requiring the party at fault to turn over its profits without need-
ing to measure the innocent party’s losses.162 But a plaintiff’s profits 
from the misfiled suit are whatever it recovers in the judgment, minus 
costs and attorney’s fees—meaning that, after the defendant pleads a 
counterclaim and set-off for breach, the plaintiff’s net recovery will 
always be zero. So instead of going through that pointless exercise, 
courts usually award specific performance, treating the forum selec-
tion clause as a bar to recovery rather than letting the suit go forward 
and trying to calculate damages afterwards.163 
While the Supreme Court hasn’t explicitly declared forum selec-
tion to be a defense, that view underlies some of its cases. In Lauro 
Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser,164 for example, the Supreme Court indicated that 
a mandatory agreement can bar the plaintiff’s recovery in other 
courts. The district court in Lauro Lines had refused to enforce the 
parties’ agreement, and the defendant tried to appeal under the col-
lateral order doctrine,165 which addresses errors that are “effectively 
unreviewable” after final judgment.166 The Court determined, though, 
that the issue could be fully addressed in an ordinary appeal. Because 
the forum selection clause conferred a binding “entitlement to be 
sued only in a particular forum,” any relief that the district court 
might award would constitute reversible error.167 In a concurrence, 
 
 161.  Cf. 15 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 117, § 3855, at 402–04, 409 n.11 (4th ed. 2013) (de-
scribing the difficulty of this inquiry with regard to appealing venue transfer decisions). 
 162.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39(1) (2011). 
 163.  See id. cmt. a (noting that courts often use specific performance “[w]here a party’s con-
tractual entitlement would be inadequately protected by the legal remedy of damages for 
breach,” and treat disgorgement as an “after the fact” remedy when “the defendant can no 
longer be required to perform”). 
 164.  490 U.S. 495 (1989). 
 165.  Id. at 497. 
 166.  Id. at 498 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 167.  Id. at 501. 
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Justice Scalia made clear that the remedy for the district court’s mis-
take was “permitting the trial to occur and reversing its outcome.”168 
That remedy can only be available if a judgment for the plaintiff 
would be legally erroneous, which means that the district court was 
supposed to have denied relief in the first place—which means that 
forum selection is a defense. The Court repeated this characterization 
in Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., where it rejected 
collateral-order appeals based on private settlement agreements.169 
The Court explained that settlements, like forum selection agree-
ments, involve “one private party secur[ing] from another a promise 
not to bring suit” under particular circumstances;170 such a promise 
confers a “broad defense to liability,”171 and it supports an appeal from 
any final “judgment [in] the plaintiff’s favor.”172 
The fact that forum selection can be a defense, though, doesn’t 
mean that it can only be a defense. There are plenty of procedural 
means for invoking a forum selection agreement, and a party has the 
right to elect its remedy. For instance, if the parties agreed to litigate 
only in state courts (and not to remove), it’d be very strange to deny 
recovery to a plaintiff who properly sues in state court and then has 
the case improperly removed by the defendant. In that case, the right 
response would be for the plaintiff to move for remand (or for dismis-
sal for forum non conveniens),173 sending the case back to the forum 
in which he had the right to sue. Likewise, if the defendant chooses to 
move for a transfer under § 1404, then some of the considerations 
usually relevant to § 1404 motions still apply. The plaintiff’s waiver of 
the right to sue might wipe out any “right to challenge the preselected 
forum as inconvenient,”174 but it doesn’t let the court ignore “public-
interest considerations”175 under a statute that requires action “in the 
interest of justice.”176 (Or, if the defendant seeks a transfer to another 
forum barred by the agreement, the defendant’s own waiver could be 
 
 168.  Id. at 502–03 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
 169.  511 US. 863 (1994). 
 170.  Id. at 880. 
 171.  Id. at 871. 
 172.  Id. at 881. 
 173.  See sources cited supra note 117. 
 174.  Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 582 (2013). 
 175.  Id. at 581. 
 176.  28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012). These public-interest considerations might also affect 
whether the forum selection agreement is enforceable on its own terms. See The Bremen v. Za-
pata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 17 (1972) (discussing whether enforcement might “contravene 
an important public policy of the forum”). 
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invoked by the plaintiff.177) 
B.  Raising the Forum Selection Defense 
The Federal Rules also provide a means of raising the forum se-
lection defense: by pleading it in the answer, seeking summary judg-
ment, or, in many cases, by raising it on motion under Rule 12. 
1.  Answer and Summary Judgment 
If forum selection is a defense, then it has to be pleaded as a de-
fense. The proper way to raise defenses under the Federal Rules is to 
plead them in the answer. Rule 12 is unequivocal: other than the sev-
en special defenses that “a party may assert . . . by motion”—such as 
jurisdiction, venue, or improper service—“[e]very defense to a claim 
for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the responsive pleading 
if one is required.”178 That accords with Rule 8’s requirement that a 
party state in the responsive pleading “its defenses to each claim as-
serted against it.”179 
In fact, if a party fails to plead forum selection in its answer, it 
ought to forfeit the defense. Under Rule 8, a defendant’s answer has 
to “affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense,”180 lest 
the defense be “forfeited” and “exclu[ded] from the case.”181 Forum 
selection is an affirmative defense, according to the ordinary defini-
tions of the term; it can’t be raised “by a simple denial in the an-
swer,”182 and it can bar recovery “even if all the allegations in the 
complaint are true.”183 The existence of a forum selection agreement 
usually doesn’t negate any element of the plaintiff’s claim, but repre-
sents an independent reason for the court to deny relief. Rule 8’s non-
exclusive list of affirmative defenses even mentions “waiver” as a spe-
cific example.184 
 
 177.  See, e.g., GDG Acquisitions, LLC v. Gov’t of Belize, 749 F.3d 1024 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 178.  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (emphasis added). 
 179.  Id. 8(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
 180.  Id. 8(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
 181.  Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1832 (2012) (alteration in original) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 182.  5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1271, at 585 (3d ed. 2004). 
 183.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 509. 
 184.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1). This rule has been interpreted as applying not only to substan-
tive waivers (as of contractual rights through subsequent courses of conduct), but also to proce-
dural ones. See, e.g., Zephyr Aviation, L.L.C. v. Dailey, 247 F.3d 565, 571 n.8 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(failure to exhaust administrative remedies); see also R.H. Cochran & Assocs. v. Sheet Metal 
Workers Int’l Ass’n Local Union No. 33, 335 F. App’x 516, 518–19 (6th Cir. 2009) (failure to 
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Pleading forum selection as a defense, though, doesn’t mean that 
the issue has to wait until trial. Instead, the defendant can get an early 
ruling on the question by motion. For starters, whatever a party might 
argue at trial, it can also raise on a motion for summary judgment. 
Those motions have an end date (30 days after discovery),185 but no 
starting date; as the Advisory Committee noted, Rule 56 lets the par-
ties seek summary judgment “at the commencement of an action” if 
they want.186 So the defendant can file its motion as soon as the com-
plaint comes in,187 attaching the forum selection agreement as an ex-
hibit and arguing that it bars recovery. Usually the parties will agree 
that the exhibit is authentic, and their only real disputes will involve 
issues of law—how the clause should be interpreted,188 what standard 
governs its validity, and so on. If so, there’s “no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact,”189 and the court can resolve the legal issues directly 
under Rule 56. If there do happen to be facts in dispute—say, over the 
parties’ relative bargaining power, or the circumstances that might 
render the agreement unfair or unreasonable—then the court can au-
thorize focused discovery under Rule 56(d)(2) and (3), resolving the 
forum selection issue without needing to proceed any further in the 
case.190 
2.  Rule 12 Motion 
Often a defendant can get a quick ruling on forum selection with-
out resorting to summary judgment, by using a Rule 12(c) or 12(b)(6) 
motion instead. Many complaints in contract cases incorporate the 
underlying contract as an exhibit, making it part of the pleading for all 
purposes under Rule 10.191 (Or, if a non-included contract is discussed 
extensively, many courts will declare it to be incorporated anyway, so 
 
raise timely objections in arbitral proceedings). 
 185.  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(b). 
 186.  FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note (2010), 28 U.S.C. app. at 268 (2012). 
 187.  Cf. id. (noting that a Rule 56 motion might be “premature until the nonmovant has 
had time to file a responsive pleading,” which won’t be a problem if the defendant is the mo-
vant). 
 188.  Cf. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 332 (2004) (“As a general rule, the construction of a 
contract is a question of law for the court.”). 
 189.  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
 190.  And even if the court denies or defers the motion under Rule 56(d)(1), the defendant 
can still get the chance to file others. Courts regularly accept successive summary judgment mo-
tions for good cause. See 11 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.121[1][b], 
at 300 & n.5 (3d ed. 1997). 
 191.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a plead-
ing is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”). 
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long as both parties agree on what it says.192) At this point, with the fo-
rum selection agreement forming part of the plaintiff’s complaint, the 
defendant has two options. The traditional course would be to raise 
the forum selection defense in the answer and then file a Rule 12(c) 
motion for judgment on the pleadings.193 But if the complaint already 
incorporates a valid forum selection agreement, there’s no need even 
to file an answer; the complaint on its face reveals an affirmative de-
fense to liability, which many courts (including the Supreme Court) 
take as a failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).194 
That practice stretches the Rule’s language somewhat. Defendants 
don’t have to plead affirmative defenses if they don’t want to, and un-
til they do, the complaint really does state a claim on which the court 
can grant relief. So the practice of raising an affirmative defense on a 
12(b)(6) may result from a misreading of the Rule.195 But the best ar-
gument in favor of the courts’ position would go something like this. 
Sometimes, just from reading the complaint, we already know that the 
plaintiff ought to lose. (Say, because the allegations concern decades-
old events way outside the statute of limitations.196) If the defendant 
raises the issue by motion, then arguably the plaintiff’s claim is no 
longer one “on which relief can be granted”—which sounds more like 
12(b)(6) territory. This was the reasoning employed by the Supreme 
Court in Jones v. Bock: so long as “the allegations in the complaint 
suffice to establish” a “ground for opposing a claim,” that claim can be 
dismissed, whatever “the nature of the ground in the abstract.”197 And 
if a valid forum selection agreement is made part of the complaint, 
then the pleading itself reveals a reason to deny relief, and the case 




 192.  See, e.g., DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable LLC, 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010); see also 5B 
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 182, § 1357, at 376 & n.1 (3d ed. 2004) (compiling sources). 
 193.  See Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 690 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 194.  See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007) (quoting Leveto v. Lapina, 258 F.3d 156, 
161 (3d Cir. 2001)); see also 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 192, § 1357, at 708–10 & nn.62–
63 (compiling sources). 
 195.  See Brownmark Films, 682 F.3d at 690; 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 182, § 1277, 
at 626–28; Rhynette Northcross Hurd, Note, The Propriety of Permitting Affirmative Defenses to 
Be Raised by Motions to Dismiss, 20 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 411 (1990); Michael E. Rosman, Af-
firmative Defenses and Rule 12(b)(6): A Plain Meaning Interpretation, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 20, 2012, at 
4, available at http://ssrn.com/id=2206027. 
 196.  See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 182, § 1226, at 306 n.10.  
 197.  549 U.S. at 215. 
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Because this kind of 12(b)(6) dismissal will often be available, and 
because it’s highly sought after by defendants, the general approach of 
viewing forum selection as an affirmative defense sometimes goes by 
the label of “12(b)(6).”198 That’s somewhat of a misnomer, as a forum 
selection defense can only be raised on a 12(b)(6) in certain favorable 
circumstances—when the agreement is itself made part of the com-
plaint, or perhaps is available for judicial notice, and so on.199 Other-
wise, the agreement constitutes “matters outside the pleadings,” which 
the court has to exclude or convert into a motion for summary judg-
ment.200 
In fact, that treatment might also be necessary depending on how 
the plaintiff tries to resist the forum selection agreement. To properly 
litigate the case, the plaintiff might need to raise factual issues that 
aren’t found in the pleadings—say, whether the forum selection 
agreement is unreasonable or unjust under The Bremen, whether it’s 
been subsequently rescinded by the parties, whether it was inserted in 
the contract through fraud in the factum, and so on. These are all ex-
tremely unlikely to be discussed in the complaint, but they can’t easily 
be excluded from consideration. They go directly to the merits of the 
motion to dismiss, and Rule 12 requires that “[a]ll parties . . . be given 
a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent 
to the motion.”201 
That wrinkle follows directly from the tensions inherent in using 
Rule 12(b)(6) to enforce affirmative defenses. Even a statute-of-
limitations defense, the easiest candidate for this treatment, can re-
quire outside facts. (For example, whether the defendant had previ-
ously agreed out of court to waive the defense, whether it’s subject to 
equitable tolling for various reasons, and so on.) Plaintiffs aren’t re-
quired to anticipate defenses in their complaints, so these issues aren’t 
easy to hash out on the pleadings. Nonetheless, because these issues 
arise relatively rarely, a Rule 12 motion will be available most of the 
time—and the “12(b)(6)” label is largely accurate. 
C.  Criticisms and Responses 
Treating forum selection as a defense has attracted the support of 
several courts and commentators. It’s also made an appearance, albeit 
 
 198.  See, e.g., Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 580 (2013). 
 199.  See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). 
 200.  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). 
 201.  Id. 
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a silent one, in the Supreme Court’s case law; the defendant in Lauro 
Lines, whom the Court considered protected from recovery outside 
the chosen court, had raised its forum selection defense in a motion to 
dismiss “pursuant to Rules 12(b) and 56.”202 
That said, scholars and judges have been generally hostile to the 
idea, either because they see it as theoretically confused or as practi-
cally awkward. In fact, much of the confusion and awkwardness lies 
on the other side. Treating forum selection as an affirmative defense is 
not only correct as a theoretical matter, but provides substantial prac-
tical advantages. To the extent that there are any practical defects with 
this approach (as there always are), they can be corrected with a rela-
tively straightforward amendment to the Federal Rules. 
1.  Criticisms in Theory 
To date, the main objections to treating forum selection as a de-
fense have been theoretical. Defenses, answers, summary judgment, 
12(b)(6): these things are all supposed to be about “substantive 
rights,”203 not “procedural”204 or “non-merits based”205 issues that apply 
only “in a particular court.”206 At oral argument in Atlantic Marine, 
Justice Kagan went so far as to describe the argument as “a bit of a 
category error,”207 mixing up questions of who should win and where 
to hold the fight. 
But these worries themselves get the categories wrong. The dis-
tinction between merits and non-merits arguments is a distinction be-
tween different kinds of defenses, not among the particular procedural 
vehicles used to raise them. Answers, summary judgment, and Rule 
12(b)(6) are routinely used to litigate defenses that are procedural, 
that don’t go to the merits, or that might be limited only to a particu-
lar court. Using these devices for forum selection is nothing new. 
 
 202.  Joint Appendix at 2–3, Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989) (No. 88-23), 
1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 620, at *2–3. 
 203.  Martin Davies, Forum Selection Clauses in Maritime Cases, 27 TUL. MAR. L.J. 367, 375 
(2003) (describing the use of Rule 12(b)(6) for forum selection as “heresy”). 
 204.  Shannon, supra note 9, at 790 (emphasis omitted); see also id. (reserving Rule 12(b)(6) 
“for the enforcement of merits-based defenses,” and arguing that forum selection “has nothing 
to do with the merits, but rather relates only to the identity of the proper forum” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 205.  Dodson, Atlantic Marine, supra note 1, at 686 n.58 (arguing that forum selection “fit[s] 
uncomfortably within a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, to say nothing of a Rule 12(c) or Rule 56 judg-
ment”). 
 206.  Staring, supra note 2, at 408. 
 207.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 
S. Ct. 568 (No. 12-929) (2013) [hereinafter Atlantic Marine Transcript]. 
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a.  Procedural Defenses 
Unlike the typical defense raised on a 12(b)(6) motion, a forum 
selection defense is procedural rather than substantive. But the Fed-
eral Rules’ default method for raising defenses doesn’t distinguish be-
tween procedure and substance. Rather, it instructs that “[e]very de-
fense to a claim for relief . . . must be asserted in the responsive plead-
ing.”208 The seven special defenses listed in Rule 12(b)—which all 
happen to be procedural—can be raised by pre-answer motion, but 
they don’t have to be. So long as the defendant avoids making any 
Rule 12 pre-answer motions on other grounds, it’s enough to plead ju-
risdiction, venue, or improper service in the answer, which avoids any 
waiver and preserves those defenses for future use.209 
In fact, the Rules require defendants to plead a number of proce-
dural defenses in the answer, depending on what one calls “procedur-
al.” That the claim is subject to issue preclusion, that it’s barred by 
laches, that the plaintiff lacks capacity to sue and be sued in this fo-
rum, that there’s an unmet condition precedent to suit (like exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies or a pre-filing notice requirement); all 
of these are usually thought of as issues of procedure, not substance. 
Yet all of them must also be “affirmatively stated”210 in the answer, 
perhaps even “specific[ally]”211 or “with particularity.”212 And if any of 
these defenses should be apparent from the face of the complaint—
say, because it alleges that the plaintiff is only 17 years old, or that the 
plaintiff has sued and lost before—then that defense can be raised 
through the vehicle of Rule 12(b)(6), regardless of its “nature.”213 Fo-
rum selection is hardly unusual in this regard, and there’s no reason to 
treat it differently. 
b.  Non-Merits Defenses 
In the Atlantic Marine oral argument, Justice Kagan suggested 
that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is an “on-the-merits determination” 
with “res judicata effect.”214 Forum selection isn’t like that, of course; 
filing suit in the wrong court won’t always bar you from refiling in the 
right court. So, the argument goes, forum selection is an inappropriate 
 
 208.  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b). 
 209.  See id. 12(h)(1)(A), (B)(ii).  
 210.  Id. 8(c)(1) (estoppel, laches). 
 211.  Id. 9(a)(2) (capacity). 
 212.  Id. 9(c) (conditions precedent). 
 213.  Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). 
 214.  Atlantic Marine Transcript, supra note 207, at 14. 
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ground for 12(b)(6)—much less a judgment under 12(c) or 56. 
The problem with this preclusion argument is its first premise. 
Like an unfavorable judgment, a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is only 
sometimes, not always, preclusive on the merits. Suppose that the con-
tract in a debt collection case, incorporated as an exhibit to the com-
plaint, conclusively reveals that the sued-on debt isn’t due for another 
month. Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, judgment on the pleadings, or sum-
mary judgment would all be perfectly correct ways to dispose of this 
premature lawsuit; on the face of the complaint, the plaintiff should 
lose. But none of these procedural vehicles would bar the plaintiff 
from returning to court in a month’s time if the debt were still unpaid. 
Rather, the judgment’s preclusive effect is to bind the parties on the 
issue of when the debt comes due, not whether it’s owed at all.215 (The 
same is true if the plaintiff will be turning 18 next month, or will have 
exhausted its administrative remedies by then, or . . . ) 
Under Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp, the 
preclusive effect of a dismissal or judgment isn’t decided by the Fed-
eral Rules, but by separate doctrines of res judicata and collateral es-
toppel, which look to the type of defense and not to the procedural 
vehicle by which it’s raised.216 A statute-of-limitations defense, for ex-
ample, is the stereotypical affirmative defense raised under Rule 
12(b)(6),217 yet it doesn’t necessarily bar suit in federal courts in other 
states.218 Certain kinds of substantive losses, of course, will wipe out a 
claim even after a favorable change in substantive law.219 But a forum-
selection dismissal—like a dismissal for forum non conveniens—
“‘den[ies] audience to a case on the merits,’” deciding only “that the 
merits should be adjudicated elsewhere.”220 As the Supreme Court 
held in Costello v. United States, a dismissal or other judgment that 
doesn’t reach the substance, one that’s ultimately “based on a plain-
tiff’s failure to comply with a precondition . . . to determin[ing] the 
merits of his substantive claim,” is generally considered to be without 
prejudice under Rule 41.221 As Semtek explains, that “ordinarily . . . 
 
 215.  Cf. Bradley Scott Shannon, Dismissing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41, 52 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 265, 277–81 (2014) (describing a variety of similar nonpreclusive dismis-
sals). 
 216.  See 531 U.S. 497, 506–07 (2001). 
 217.  See Jones, 549 U.S. at 215. 
 218.  See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 504. 
 219.  See 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 117, § 4415, at 369–70 & nn.38–39 (2d ed. 2002). 
 220.  Sinochem Int’l v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 432 (2007) (alteration in 
original; quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999)). 
 221.  365 U.S. 265, 285 (1961). 
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[has] the consequence of not barring the claim from other courts.” 
Because a forum selection agreement makes filing suit in the chosen 
forum a precondition to reaching the merits, a dismissal on forum se-
lection grounds wouldn’t always prevent the plaintiff from trying 
again in another court222—or even in the same court, should the de-
fendant be willing to waive this defense. 
c.  Court-Dependent Defenses 
Some commentators have viewed the 12(b)(6) device as “highly 
strained, because failure to state a claim ordinarily is the apparent 
lack of any substantial right and not just the inability to enforce it in a 
particular court.”223 But other defenses are also specific to particular 
courts. For example, a judgment with prejudice under Rule 41 defi-
nitely bars the plaintiff from refiling the same claim in the same court, 
but it doesn’t always serve as a bar in any other courts, state or feder-
al.224 So if the case had been dismissed by, say, the Central District of 
California, then preclusion might represent a good defense in the 
Central District, whether or not it’d work anywhere else. And if the 
complaint in the second suit happened to describe what went on in 
the first, then preclusion would be a perfectly good ground for dismis-
sal under Rule 12(b)(6). 
More generally, there’s nothing strange about forum selection be-
ing a defense to liability that applies only in particular courts. The es-
sence of the Court’s holding in CompuCredit is that one may have a 
substantive right—even a nonwaivable right—“to impose liability” on 
another party without having a similar right to do so “in all competent 
courts.”225 Like venue or personal jurisdiction, forum selection is a 
good defense in some districts but not others. But unlike those de-
fenses, it hasn’t been given a special status under Rule 12(b), and so 
should be treated like any other affirmative defense. 
d.  The No-Rule Alternative 
One other criticism of relying on Rule 12(b)(6) is that we might 
not need any rule to rely on in the first place. Bradley Shannon has 
 
 222.  That said, deliberately abusive suits in multiple courts might produce a different re-
sponse. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20, cmt. n (1982) (noting that “estoppel 
or laches” may bar a second suit when “it would be plainly unfair to subject the defendant to a 
second action”); Sachs Brief, supra note * , at 26 n.14. 
 223.  Staring, supra note 2, at 408. 
 224.  See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 506. 
 225.  CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 671 (2012) (emphasis omitted). 
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argued that courts can dismiss cases on motion merely for violating a 
forum selection agreement, without citing any particular provision of 
the Federal Rules.226 This, in fact, seems to be common practice in fo-
rum non conveniens dismissals,227 perhaps because modern forum non 
conveniens doctrine only took shape after the Federal Rules were in 
place.228 But there’s no obvious legal basis for this practice. If personal 
jurisdiction, venue, and failure to join a necessary party aren’t too 
procedural to be called “defenses” by Rule 12(b),229 then neither is fo-
rum non conveniens—in which case it, too, should fall within that 
Rule’s catchall requirement that “[e]very defense,” other than the 
special seven, “be asserted in the responsive pleading.”230 (Judicial es-
toppel also proceeds from the courts’ inherent powers,231 but “estop-
pel” still has to be pleaded under Rule 8(c).232) In any case, even if the 
courts have created an ad hoc exception for forum non conveniens, 
there’s no reason to extend their error to forum selection. 
2.  Criticisms in Practice 
Other criticisms of the forum selection defense are based in prac-
tice, not theory. Compared to the mechanisms the Court approved in 
Atlantic Marine—of § 1404 transfer or forum non conveniens dismis-
sal—advancing a forum selection defense may take too long to re-
solve; may require a jury trial on contested facts; and may create un-
fairness when the statute of limitations has lapsed. 
In fact, none of these criticisms holds much weight. A forum selec-
tion defense can be advanced quickly on motion and may be waived if 
the defendant delays in raising it. While a jury trial might be necessary 
in unusual cases, that’s an entirely appropriate way to proceed in a ju-
ry case, and it’s the same procedure we use to protect other defend-
ants enforcing prior settlements or arbitration awards. And although 
plaintiffs who file in the wrong forum may find themselves outside the 
limitations period, that may not always be unfair—and when it is, 
judges can invoke § 1404 sua sponte instead. 
 
 226.  Shannon, supra note 9, at 792–93. 
 227.  See id. at 793; see also Atlantic Marine Transcript, supra note 207, at 20 (“JUSTICE 
KENNEDY: You just cite Gulf Oil, and that’s it?”). 
 228.  See generally Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). 
 229.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (“But a party may assert the following defenses by motion: 
. . . .”); id. 12(b)(2), (3), (7). 
 230.  Id. 12(b). 
 231.  See Montrose Med. Grp. Participating Sav. Plan v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 773, 779 (3d Cir. 
2001); see also supra notes 136–137 and accompanying text. 
 232.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1) (“estoppel”). 
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a.  Timing 
Transfers under § 1404 have two alleged advantages with respect 
to timing. First, an eager defendant can get the case transferred quick-
ly, because a § 1404 motion may be made at virtually any time—even 
before all defendants have been served with process.233 Second, a dila-
tory defendant will have reasons to move quickly, because a court has 
discretion to deny a § 1404 motion that’s filed too late in the game.234 
By contrast, the argument goes, if the forum selection agreement 
hasn’t been made part of the plaintiff’s complaint, then ordinarily it 
wouldn’t be possible to raise the defense until the defendant files an 
answer. That means the defendant has to “admit or deny” all of “the 
allegations asserted against it,”235 after conducting an “inquiry reason-
able under the circumstances”236—which could mean an enormous 
amount of unnecessary investigation. If the defendant wants to raise 
any other pre-answer motions, it’ll have to litigate those first, in a 
court that ostensibly shouldn’t even be hearing the case. Moreover, 
some claim that even if the agreement were incorporated in the com-
plaint, a dilatory defendant wouldn’t have to raise the issue by pre-
answer motion; instead, it could raise the affirmative defense in its an-
swer and then wait to litigate the issue at trial.237 
These worries, though, are overblown. If the agreement isn’t in-
corporated in the pleadings, a defendant that wants an early decision 
on forum selection can bring a pre-answer motion for summary judg-
ment, which can involve as many “matters outside the pleadings”238 as 
it likes. As noted above, summary judgment can be sought as soon as 
the case is filed, even “at the commencement of an action.”239 So eager 
defendants can bring up forum selection defenses as early as they 
choose. 
Even were summary judgment not available, making defendants 
wait to process forum selection as a defense would hardly be that 
much to ask. The Federal Rules expect just the same of defendants 
that have already settled the case, already completed an arbitration, 
 
 233.  See 15 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 161, § 3844, at 64 & n.20. 
 234.  See id. at 64 & n.25; see also In re Apple Inc., 456 F. App’x 907, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 235.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(1)(B). 
 236.  Id. 11(b). 
 237.  See Sucampo Pharms., Inc. v. Astellas Pharma, Inc., 471 F.3d 544, 549 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(making this criticism); Ryan T. Holt, A Uniform System for the Enforceability of Forum Selec-
tion Clauses in Federal Courts, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1913, 1924 n.70 (2009) (same). 
 238.  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). 
 239.  FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note (2010), 28 U.S.C. app. at 268 (2012). 
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or already litigated the case to judgment and won: “release,” “arbitra-
tion and award,” “res judicata,” and “estoppel” are all ordinary af-
firmative defenses under Rule 8.240 Each of those defenses involves 
just as much need for certainty, efficiency, and repose as would a fo-
rum-selection agreement.241 
Nor can a dilatory defendant feel safe bringing up the forum se-
lection issue late in the game. The issue be forfeited if not “affirma-
tively state[d]” in the answer;242 and while answers can be amended 
under Rule 15,243 leave may be denied after an unnecessary delay.244 
And if the defendant waits too long to seek judgment on the issue, 
continuing to litigate in the “wrong” forum, there’s a strong likelihood 
that the plaintiff’s waiver of the right to sue may itself be waived. A 
defendant that sleeps on its rights, proceeding with the suit even while 
ostensibly objecting to the forum, may be found to have lost any fo-
rum selection defense.245 
b.  Factfinding and Jury Trial 
A second difference between forum selection and the other alter-
natives involves factfinding. Under Rule 43, the court conducts all 
factfinding relevant to a motion—including a motion under § 1404 or 
forum non conveniens.246 That’s not the case, though, for motions un-
der Rules 12(b)(6), 12(c), or 56. Under Rule 12(d), if “matters outside 
the pleading” are involved, the first two motions will be converted in-
to the third; and if those matters present “genuine dispute[s]” as to 
“material fact[s],” summary judgment will be denied and the issues 
left for trial.247 As the Court noted in Atlantic Marine, the prospect of 
waiting for a jury trial—as compared to a quick ruling from the 
bench—will likely encourage many defendants to seek relief by some 
 
 240.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1). 
 241.  See Sachs Brief, supra note * , at 20. 
 242.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1). 
 243.  See 5C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 117, § 1394, at 555 (3d ed. 2004) (“A party may 
avoid waiver by seeking leave from the district court to amend his pleading to interpose an af-
firmative defense that has been inadvertently omitted.”). 
 244.  See 6 id. § 1488, at 764 (3d ed. 2010). 
 245.  See 13D id. § 3569, at 526–28 & nn.83–84 (3d ed. 2008); id. § 3569, at 167–68 (Supp. 
2014); see also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 (1983) 
(same rule for arbitration); 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 135, § 3828, at 627 & n.17 (same 
rule for forum non conveniens); see also Sachs Brief, supra note * , at 23–24. 
 246.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 43(c) (“When a motion relies on facts outside the record, the court 
may hear the matter on affidavits or may hear it wholly or partly on oral testimony or on deposi-
tions.”). 
 247.  Id. 56(a). 
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other motion instead.248 
The fact that § 1404 or forum non conveniens may sometimes be 
more useful, though, doesn’t mean that the affirmative-defense ap-
proach is legally incorrect. Again, the wronged party has an election 
of remedies, and can choose the one that best suits its purposes. In 
fact, leaving genuine factual disputes to the jury makes a lot of sense. 
Suppose that the parties really do disagree about the facts: whether 
the contract was made under duress, whether the forum selection 
clause was inserted by fraud, whether that’s even the plaintiff’s signa-
ture, and so on. If the parties have a Seventh Amendment right to a 
jury trial of the case as a whole, why shouldn’t the jury determine 
these questions too—rather than have a judge send the case packing 
on his or her own authority? Indeed, the real question is why a court 
is allowed to keep these issues from the jury under § 1404. In the arbi-
tration context, where speed and efficiency are no less important, dis-
putes over the “making of the agreement” are required by statute to 
proceed to “jury trial.”249 So are any factual questions involved in con-
struing a prior settlement,250 though settlements, too, are designed to 
avoid further litigation. In any case, the number of truly genuine fac-
tual disputes over forum selection is likely to be small; most contracts 
speak for themselves, and the relatively narrow scope of the “unfair” 
and “unreasonable” exceptions under Carnival Cruise251 mean that 
most objections to enforcement could be addressed as a matter of law. 
c.  Dismissal and Unfairness 
If the wronged party can choose between dismissal and venue 
transfer, why should it make much difference? In fact, one significant 
change created by the forum selection defense has to do with the 
statute of limitations. A § 1404 transfer preserves the original dates of 
filing and service, as far as limitations periods are concerned. But if 
the case is dismissed and refiled, then the plaintiff may actually be 
barred forever if the statute of limitations has lapsed. That’s why, in 
§ 1406, Congress provided for the option of transfer (and not just 
dismissal) if venue turns out to have been laid in the wrong district.252 
 
 248.  Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 580 n.4 (2013). 
 249.  9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012); see also Sachs Brief, supra note * , at 24–25. 
 250.  See Anthony DiSarro, Six Degrees of Separation: Settlement Agreements and Consent 
Orders in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 288 n.77 (2010) (listing cases). 
 251.  See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–95 (1991). 
 252.  28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2012) (“The district court of a district in which is filed a case lay-
ing venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, trans-
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If, though, a case is mistakenly filed in violation of a forum selec-
tion agreement, then a dismissal without res judicata effect (as dis-
cussed above) may still turn out to be a death sentence if the limita-
tions period has run out. How can this unfairness be justified? 
The first thing to note is that the situation isn’t always unfair. In 
the forum non conveniens context, courts sometimes require defend-
ants to waive limitations defenses when the case is refiled253—but not 
always.254 Treating forum selection as a defense isn’t any less danger-
ous, limitations-wise, than treating it as a ground for forum non con-
veniens dismissal—a historically accepted approach that the Court 
specifically approved in Atlantic Marine.255 Moreover, if the plaintiff 
had waived its right to file in that forum—and if this waiver is neither 
“unreasonable” nor “unjust”256—then the defendant is presumably en-
titled to have the case dismissed, and the loss of the claim is the plain-
tiff’s own fault. As the Court explained, “when the plaintiff has violat-
ed a contractual obligation by filing suit in a forum other than the one 
specified in a valid forum-selection clause,” a “dismissal would work 
no injustice on the plaintiff,” even if the statute of limitations has al-
ready run.257 
The second thing to note is that a dismissal remedy can actually 
enhance fairness rather than undermine it. Under § 1404, a district 
court can grant a venue transfer at either party’s request, or even sua 
sponte. So if dismissal truly would work some great injustice, the court 
can always intervene to transfer the case instead. But sometimes jus-
tice requires dismissal. For example, dismissal might be a more appro-
priate punishment for a plaintiff that has repeatedly sued in an incor-
rect forum solely in order to harass. In 1949, Congress amended 
§ 1406 to make sure that the court retained the option of dismissing 
the action instead of transferring, in case that outcome would be more 
just.258 But if § 1404 were the only remedy for violating a forum selec-
 
fer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.”); see Goldlawr, Inc. 
v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962) (describing the statute’s purposes). 
 253.  See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 242 (1981). 
 254.  See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 583 n.8 (citing Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 31 
(1955)). 
 255.  See id. at 580; see also Marcus, supra note 3 (describing the history). 
 256.  The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972). 
 257.  Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 583 n.8. 
 258.  See Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 81, 63 Stat. 89, 101; Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 466; 14D 
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 135, § 3827, at 555 (noting a pattern of dismissal “if the plaintiff’s at-
torney reasonably could have foreseen that the forum in which the suit was filed was improper 
and that similar conduct should be discouraged”); Sachs, supra note 79, at 765 & n.25. 
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tion agreement, then that option would be off the table. 
One further problem with relying on § 1404 as the only remedy is 
that it’s ill-suited to complex litigation. As I’ve noted in other work, in 
a lawsuit with multiple claims and parties, a forum selection agree-
ment might cover only some of each.259 Atlantic Marine instructs 
courts to grant § 1404 transfers much more freely when there’s a 
mandatory forum selection agreement involved,260 but it didn’t specify 
what to do when the agreement leaves certain claims or parties out. 
This is a real problem, because § 1404 is an all-or-nothing inquiry: do 
we transfer the whole action or not? Courts are already struggling to 
decide whether (1) to sever claims and parties covered by forum se-
lection agreements from those that are not, applying the Supreme 
Court’s new § 1404 standards only to the former, or (2) to consider 
the transfer motion with respect to the entire action, applying some 
sort of amalgamated standard.261 By contrast, allowing a district court 
to dismiss some claims and to retain others tailors the remedy to the 
underlying right, and it reduces the risk of hamfisted all-or-nothing 
decisions. In other words, permitting dismissal, and not merely trans-
fer, enables courts to reach just results in a broader range of cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Forum selection, whether permissive or mandatory, is best under-
stood as a form of procedural waiver. That means that it’s governed 
by procedural law, and in particular by federal law in a federal court. 
Under the current structure of the Federal Rules, moreover, manda-
tory forum selection is a defense, something that can be raised by 
pleading or by dispositive motion. 
This account is offered as the best understanding of current law. 
That said, current law may not be so great. For example, the require-
ment that parties plead forum selection in the answer, and that genu-
ine disputes of fact go to a full-blown trial, may interfere with the en-
forcement of perfectly valid forum selection clauses. 
If so, there’s an easy remedy. The Judicial Conference could pro-
pose an amendment to Rule 12,262 creating a new “12(b)(8)” defense 
of “violation of a valid forum selection agreement.” (To avoid a giant 
 
 259.  See Sachs, supra note 79, at 771–73. 
 260.  Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581–83. 
 261.  See In re Rolls Royce Corp., 775 F.3d 671, 679–81 (5th Cir. 2014); see also Sachs, supra 
note 79, at 773 nn.83 & 86 (collecting sources). 
 262.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(1) (2012). 
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Erie kerfuffle, the rule itself could stay agnostic as to what makes such 
agreements valid.) That defense could be made waivable under Rule 
12(h)(1), could be listed as a non-merits defense under Rule 41(b), 
and would automatically be subject to the judicial factfinding provi-
sions of Rule 43(c). In other words, we could effectively recreate the 
system that many courts of appeals maintained before Atlantic Ma-
rine, by which mandatory forum selection was viewed—without legal 
basis, alas—as a nonstatutory defect in venue.263 
If we want to amend the Federal Rules, though, the right way to 
do that is by amending the Federal Rules, “not by judicial interpreta-
tion.”264 Courts have to decide cases under the rules we have today. 




 263.  See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 577–79. 
 264.  Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 213 (2007) (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcot-
ics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)). 
